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SUBCOMPLETE FORCING PRINCIPLES AND DEFINABLE
WELL-ORDERS
GUNTER FUCHS
Abstract. It is shown that the boldface maximality principle for subcomplete
forcing, MPSC(Hω2 ), together with the assumption that the universe has only
set-many grounds, implies the existence of a well-ordering of P(ω1) definable
without parameters. The same conclusion follows from MPSC(Hω2 ), assuming
there is no inner model with an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals. Sim-
ilarly, the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom, together with the assumption
that x# does not exist, for some x ⊆ ω, implies the existence of a well-ordering
of P(ω1) which is ∆1-definable without parameters, and ∆1(Hω2 )-definable
using a subset of ω1 as a parameter. This well-order is in L(P(ω1)). Enhanced
version of bounded forcing axioms are introduced that are strong enough to
have the implications of MPSC(Hω2 ) mentioned above.
1. Introduction
This article is part of a larger project the theme of which is a comparison between
the effects of subcomplete forcing principles and those for other, more familiar
classes of forcing, such as proper, semiproper or stationary set preserving forcing
notions.
Subcomplete forcing was introduced by Jensen [20], see also [21] for an overview
article. Subcomplete forcing does not add reals, and the main result of [20] is that
it can be iterated with revised countable support. It is pointed out in the same
paper that every countably closed forcing is subcomplete. On the other hand, no
nontrivial ccc forcing is subcomplete, see [24]. Subcomplete forcing can change the
cofinality of a regular cardinal to be countable; for example, assuming the contin-
uum hypothesis, Namba forcing is subcomplete, and Prˇ´ıkry´ forcing is subcomplete
as well (these results can be found in Jensen [21]), and the Magidor forcing to
collapse the cofinality of a measurable cardinal of Mitchell order ω1 to ω1 is sub-
complete (see Fuchs [9]). So there are subcomplete forcing notions that are not
proper, and vice versa. Every subcomplete forcing preserves stationary subsets of
ω1.
Jensen showed in [19] that one can force the subcomplete forcing axiom (SCFA),
that is, Martin’s axiom for subcomplete forcing, over a model with a supercompact
cardinal, in much the same way that one can force the proper forcing axiom, PFA,
under the same assumption. While SCFA does not imply the continuum hypothesis,
as Martin’s Maximum implies SCFA + 2ω = ω2, the natural model resulting from
a Baumgartner style iteration of subcomplete forcing notions will satisfy SCFA, to-
gether with CH, and even Jensen’s combinatorial principle ♦, because subcomplete
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forcing does not add reals and preserves ♦. Being consistent with the continuum
hypothesis makes SCFA stand out.
It is now interesting to compare the consequences of SCFA to those of PFA and
even MM. Jensen showed that SCFA implies SCH and the failure of τ , for all
uncountable cardinals τ . In [7], I began a more detailed analysis of the effects
of SCFA (and its bounded versions) on the failure of weak square principles, and
in joint work with Rinot [14], this analysis was completed. It turned out that
they are extremely close to the effects of MM, and the only difference seems to be
attributable to the fact that SCFA is consistent with CH, while MM is not. In the
paper [11], I determined the effects of SCFA on the failure of weak variants of the
Todorcˇevic´ square principles, and again, the situation turned out to be very similar
to that of MM - the only difference stemming from the fact that SCFA does not
imply the failure of CH. Other previous research focused on forcing principles for
subcomplete forcing other than the traditional axioms, such as resurrection axioms
(see [8]) or maximality principles (see [24]).
In the present paper, I explore another instance of the somewhat surprising phe-
nomenon that despite the substantial difference between proper and subcomplete
forcing, their forcing principles nevertheless have very similar effects on the set
theoretic universe.
Namely, I investigate situations in which forcing principles for subcomplete forc-
ing imply the existence of definable well-orderings of P(ω1). There is a history of
results on the existence of definable well-orderings of R, and even of P(ω1), as a con-
sequence of forcing axioms. Results include (chronologically): MM =⇒ 2ω = ω2
(Foreman-Magidor-Shelah, [5]), PFA =⇒ 2ω = ω2 (Velicˇkovic´ [32], Todorcˇevic´
[3]), MM =⇒ there is a well-ordering of R definable (with parameters) in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
(Woodin [33]), BMM implies there is a well-ordering of R definable (with parame-
ters) in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 (Todorcˇevic´ [30]), BPFA implies there is a well-ordering of P(ω1)
∆2-definable (with parameters) in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 (Moore [26]), BPFA implies there is
a well-ordering of P(ω1) ∆1-definable (with parameters) in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 (Caicedo-
Velickovic [4]).
By completely different methods, I will show that certain subcomplete forcing
principles have similar effects on the existence of definable well-orders of P(ω1),
under appropriate additional assumptions. In Section 2, the forcing principle un-
der consideration is the boldface maximality principle for subcomplete forcing,
MPSC(Hω2). This is the scheme expressing that every statement about an element
of Hω2 that can be forced to be true by a subcomplete forcing in such a way that it
will remain in every further forcing extension by a subcomplete forcing is already
true in V. The additional assumption I use in this section is that the universe has
only set-many inner models (grounds) of which it is a set-forcing extension. This
is maybe an unexpected appearance of an assumption on the set-theoretic geology
(see [12]) of the ambient universe, but it guarantees that the mantle M, the inter-
section of all grounds, is itself a ground model of the universe, hence is very “close
to V”. It is known that the mantle is invariant under set forcing, and hence, the
assumption of set many grounds provides us with a forcing invariant inner model
that’s close to V. By work of Usuba ([31]), the assumption that there are only set
many grounds follows from the existence of a rather strong large cardinal, called
hyper huge. I recap the basics of set-theoretic geology and maximality principles in
more detail in this section, and then prove the main result, that if MPSC holds and
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there are only set-many grounds, then there is a well-order of P(ω1), of order-type
ω2, definable without parameters. This is Theorem 2.7. A corollary of this theorem
is that if MPSC(Hω2) holds and there are only set many grounds, and if a forcing
notion P preserves MPSC(Hω2) and ω2, then P cannot add subsets of ω1. This is
Corollary 2.10. The same conclusions can be made assuming MPSC(Hω2) and the
absence of an inner model with an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals, see
Corollary 2.16.
It is easy to see thatMPSC(Hω2) is a a strengthening of the version of the bounded
forcing axiom for subcomplete forcing, BSCFA. In Section 3, I deal with this latter
principle, and show that in the absence of 0#, or just of x#, for some x ⊆ ω1,
BSCFA implies the existence of a well-order of P(ω1) of order type ω2, definable
in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 in a ∆1 way, using a subset of ω1 as a parameter, and this well-order
is in L(P(ω1)) (which thus is a model of ZFC). This is Lemma 3.5. A similar
conclusion on the preservation of BSCFA (in the absence of 0#) under forcing is
made in Lemma 3.6: if P preserves ω2 and BSCFA, then it cannot add a subset of
ω1.
In Section 4, I make an excursion on ways to strengthen the bounded forcing
axiom for different forcing classes. The motivation for doing this is that I want to
find principles located between BSCFA and MPSC(Hω2) that are still strong enough
to yield the results of Section 2. The results in this section are not needed for
the following section, but are of independent interest. I argue that the “correct”
version of the bounded forcing axiom for countably closed forcing notions should
be the statement that whenever G is generic for a countably closed forcing notion,
then Hω2 ≺Σ2 H
V[G]
ω2 . The reason is that this statement has the same consistency
strength as the bounded forcing axiom for other iterable forcing classes, such as
the collection of proper, semi-proper or subcomplete forcing notions, and that it
makes an analogous statement about generic absoluteness as the characterization
of the traditional bounded forcing axioms by Bagaria: the level of elementarity is
one more than guaranteed by ZFC.
Section 5 introduces enhanced bounded forcing axioms, essentially guaranteeing
Σ1-elementarity with respect to the structure 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉, where I is some
adequate definable class. I calculate the consistency strength of an enhanced prin-
ciple that is strong enough to guarantee the conclusions of Section 2, and develop
a type of large cardinal that allows us to produce forcing extensions where this
principle holds.
2. Well-orders from maximality principles for subcomplete forcing
The first forcing principle I will look at is a maximality principle, introduced in
generality by Stavi and Va¨a¨na¨nen [28] and Hamkins [16].
Definition 2.1. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions (here we can take it to be
definable without parameters), and let X be a term defining a set (again, for the
present purposes, it can be taken to be a parameter free definition). Then MPΓ(X),
the maximality principle for Γ, with parameters from X, is the scheme of formulas
asserting, for every formula ϕ(~x) and for all ~a ∈ X , that if ϕ(~a) can be forced to
be true by a forcing notion P ∈ Γ in such a way that for every P-name Q˙ such that
P“Q˙ ∈ Γ”, P∗Q˙ ϕ(~a), then ϕ(~a) holds already in V.
If Γ is the class of subcomplete forcing notions, then I write MPSC(X) for the
principle. The boldface maximality principle for subcomplete forcing is when X =
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Hω2 , so MPSC(Hω2). If Γ is the class of countably closed forcing notions, the
resulting principle is denoted MPσ-closed(X), and again, the boldface maximality
principle for countably closed forcing uses the parameter set X = Hω2 , denoted
MPσ-closed(Hω2).
In the context of maximality principles for subcomplete forcing, I will say (as is
customary) that a statement ϕ is subcomplete-forceable if it can be forced to hold
by a subcomplete forcing, and it is subcomplete-necessary if it holds in any forcing
extension obtained by subcomplete forcing. It is subcomplete-forceably necessary
if the statement “ϕ is subcomplete-necessary” is subcomplete-forceable.
The maximality principles for countably closed forcing notions (as well as <κ-
closed forcing notions, and other classes) were studied in detail in [6]. The versions
for subcomplete forcing were considered in [24], and the emerging picture was that
the boldface maximality principles for these two classes have very similar conse-
quences. For example, they both imply Jensen’s ♦ principle and the nonexistence
of Kurepa trees. The present work will indicate that they are rather different, after
all, at least under a suitable assumption on the set-theoretic geology of the universe
under consideration.
To explain this assumption, I will have to say a few words about set-theoretic
geology. Research in this area, initiated in [12], is concerned with the structure
of grounds of a universe V. An inner model M of ZFC is a ground if V = M [g],
for some g which is generic over M for some forcing P ∈ M . The chief object
of study is the mantle M, that is the intersection of all grounds. It was shown
in [12, Corollary 13] that the mantle M is a definable class, and the following
strong downward directedness of grounds hypothesis (strong DDG) was isolated
there ([12, Definition 19]): the grounds of the universe are downward set-directed.
It was shown in [12, Theorem 22] that the strong DDG implies that the mantle M
is a model of ZFC. An auxiliary inner model, called the generic mantle, was also
introduced in [12, Definition 42], defined to be the intersection of all mantles of all
set-forcing extensions. It was shown in [12, Theorem 44] that the generic mantle is
an inner model of ZF invariant under set-forcing. Finally, in [12, Corollary 51], it
was shown that if the generic DDG holds, that is, if in all set-forcing extensions, the
grounds are downward directed, then the mantle and the generic mantle coincide.
In a major step for set-theoretic geology, it was shown recently in [31, Theo-
rem 1.3] that it is a ZFC theorem that the grounds are downward set directed. In
particular, the generic DDG also holds, and, putting this together with the pre-
viously known implications of downward directedness, it follows that the mantle
M is a forcing-invariant model of ZFC. This fact also shows that if there are only
set-many grounds, then there is a smallest ground, known as a bedrock (see [27]),
which in this situation is equal to the mantle. So if there are only set-many grounds,
then the universe is a set-forcing extension of its mantle, and it is easy to see that
these conditions are equivalent, because if V = M[G], where G is generic overM for
some complete Boolean algebra B ∈ M, then every ground W of V is squeezed in
between M and V, and hence is a forcing extension of M by a subalgebra of B, so
there are only set-many possibilities for W . It is this assumption on geology that
is used in the theorem on the existence of a definable well-ordering of P(ω1).
I would now like to give some background on subcomplete forcing. The concept
was introduced by Jensen [20].
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Definition 2.2. A transitive set N (usually a model of ZFC−) is full if there is an
ordinal γ such that Lγ(N) |= ZFC
− and N is regular in Lγ(N), meaning that if
x ∈ N , f ∈ Lγ(N) and f : x −→ N , then ran(f) ∈ N .
Definition 2.3. For a poset P, δ(P) is the minimal cardinality of a dense subset
of P.
Definition 2.4. Let N = LAτ = 〈Lτ [A],∈, A ∩ Lτ [A]〉 be a ZFC
− model, ε an
ordinal and X ∪ {ε} ⊆ N . Then CNε (X) is the smallest Y ≺ N (with respect to
inclusion) such that X ∪ ε ⊆ Y .
Models N of the form described in the previous definition have definable Skolem-
functions, so that the definition of CNε (X) makes sense.
Definition 2.5. A forcing notion P is subcomplete if there is a cardinal θ which
verifies the subcompleteness of P, which means that P ∈ Hθ, and for any ZFC
−
model N = LAτ with θ < τ and Hθ ⊆ Lτ [A], any σ : N¯ ≺ N such that N¯ is
countable, transitive and full and such that P, θ ∈ ran(σ), any G¯ ⊆ P¯ which is
P¯-generic over N¯ , and any s ∈ ran(σ), the following holds. Letting σ(〈s¯, θ¯, P¯〉) =
〈s, θ,P〉, there is a condition p ∈ P such that whenever G ⊆ P is P-generic over V
with p ∈ G, there is in V[G] a σ′ such that
(1) σ′ : N¯ ≺ N ,
(2) σ′(〈s¯, θ¯, P¯〉) = 〈s, θ,P〉,
(3) (σ′)“G¯ ⊆ G,
(4) CNδ(P)(ran(σ
′)) = CNδ(P)(ran(σ)).
Jensen showed that if one requires σ′ = σ in the previous definition, the resulting
concept is equivalent to saying that the complete Boolean algebra of P is isomorphic
to that of a countably closed forcing. Thus, in a sense, subcompleteness can be
viewed as a natural weakening of countable closure. The main fact on subcomplete
forcing that I will need is the following remarkable theorem of Jensen [18].
Theorem 2.6. Let κ be an inaccessible cardinal, and assume that GCH holds below
κ. Let A ⊆ κ be a set of regular cardinals. Then there is a subcomplete, κ-c.c. forc-
ing P of size κ such that if G is P-generic, then κ = ω
V[G]
2 and for every regular
τ ∈ (ω1, κ),
cfV [G](τ) =
{
ω1 if τ ∈ A
ω otherwise.
I will call this forcing the extended Namba forcing for A, and denote it by NA,κ.
The idea is to use it to code subsets of ω1 into the “cofinality ω/ω1 pattern”.
Theorem 2.7. Assume MPSC(Hω2), and assume that there are only set-many
grounds. Then there is a well-ordering of P(ω1), definable without parameters,
of order type ω2 (and in particular, 2
ω1 = ω2).
Proof. If there are only set-many grounds, then all of these grounds have a common
ground, by Usuba’s result. This common ground then is the mantleM, and it follows
that V = M[g], for some g which is generic over M for some forcing P in M. Since
M is forcing-absolute, letting δ = ω2, it follows from MPSC(Hω2) that V
M
δ ≺ M,
by verifying the Tarski-Vaught criterion for elementary substructures; see the proof
of [6, Theorem 3.8] and [6, Lemma 4.15]. Since δ is regular, it follows that δ is
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inaccessible in M. This, in turn, implies that there is a proper class of inaccessible
cardinals in M, and since V is a set forcing extension of M, also in V.
Let α ≥ P
+
, and let 〈κi | i ≤ ω1〉 enumerate the next ω1+1 inaccessible cardinals
above α. We can perform an Easton iteration of at least countably closed forcing
notions in order to reach an extension in which GCH holds below κω1 , such that if
h is generic, then each κi is still inaccessible in V[h]. Now, given a subset A of ω1
in V, let A˜ = {κi | i ∈ A}. Then let Q = NA˜,κω1
be the extended Namba forcing
for A˜ in V[h]. Thus, Q is κω1-c.c., and if G is Q-generic over V[h], then for every
µ ∈ A˜, V[h][G] thinks that cf(µ) = ω1, and for every ν ∈ κω1 \ A˜ which is regular
in V[h], V[h][G] thinks that cf(ν) = ω. In particular, the latter is true for every κj
with j < ω1, j /∈ A, since κj remains regular in V[h]. κω1 becomes ω2 in V[h][G].
Now if V[h][G][I] is a further subcomplete forcing extension of V[h][G], then
the cofinality of κi, for i < ω1, cannot change, since subcomplete forcing does
not add reals. Moreover, the sequence 〈κi | i < ω1〉 is definable in V[h][G][I] from
the parameter α, as the enumeration of the next ω1 many inaccessible cardinals
in M beyond α. Hence, A is definable in V[h][G][I] as the set of i < ω1 such
that cf(κi) = ω1. Let ψ(A,α) be the statement expressing that if 〈λi | i < ω1〉
enumerates the next ω1 many inaccessible cardinals of M beyond α, then for all
i < ω1, i ∈ A iff cf(λi) = ω1. Then the statement ϕ(A), expressing that there is
an α such that ψ(A,α) holds in V[h][G][I]. Since I was generic for an arbitrary
subcomplete forcing notion in V[h][G], this means that ϕ(A) is necessary with
respect to subcomplete forcing extensions in V[h][G], and hence it is forceably
necessary with respect to subcomplete forcing in V. It follows by MPSC(Hω2) that
ϕ(A) already holds in V. Since ϕ(A) was an arbitrary subset of ω1 in V, it follows
that ϕ(B) holds, for every B ⊆ ω1.
Given A ⊆ ω1, let β be such that ψ(A, β) holds. In VCol(ω1,β), and in any further
subcomplete forcing extension, ψ(A, β) continues to hold, and β < ω2 there. Thus,
if we let αA be least such that ψ(A,αA) holds, it is subcomplete forceably necessary
that αA < ω2, and so, it is already less than ω2. This shows that if we define A <
∗ B
iff αA < αB , for A,B ⊆ P(ω1), then this is a well-ordering of P(ω1) of order type
ω2. 
Note that the conclusion of the previous theorem implies that P(ω1) ⊆ HOD.
Of course, we don’t really need the coding points to be inaccessible cardinals.
The following cardinals will do.
Definition 2.8. A regular cardinal κ ≥ ω2 is a GCH survivor if it remains a
regular cardinal after performing the standard forcing to force GCH.
For example, successors of strong limit cardinals are GCH survivors. All we
needed in the proof of the previous theorem was that inaccessible cardinals are
GCH survivors, and since we don’t need a proper class of inaccessible cardinals, we
will be able to work with the lightface maximality principle MPSC, that is MPSC(∅),
in the following theorem, but we will only get a well-order of R. Note that the
lightface MPSC already implies CH. This is because the standard forcing Add(ω1, 1)
to add a new subset to ω1 with countable conditions forces CH, and it is countably
closed, hence subcomplete. Further subcomplete forcing cannot add reals, and
hence preserves CH. Thus, CH is subcomplete-forceably necessary.
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Theorem 2.9. Assume MPSC, and assume that there are only set-many grounds.
Then there is a well-ordering of R, definable without parameters.
Proof. Let α be greater than the chain condition of the forcing leading from M
to V, and let 〈κn | n < ω〉 enumerate the next ω many GCH survivors above α.
We can perform an Easton iteration of at least countably closed forcing notions in
order to reach an extension in which GCH holds below κ˜ = supn<ω κn, such that
if h is generic, each κn is still a regular cardinal V[h]. Now, given a real a ⊆ ω in
V, and letting a˜ = {κn | n ∈ a}, the extended Namba forcing Na˜,κ˜ can be used
to reach a model V[h][G] that thinks that for every n < ω, cf(κn) = ω1 iff n ∈ a
and cf(κn) = ω iff n /∈ a, even though we are not working below an inaccessible
cardinal, see [19, Chapter 3, pp. 16-17]; κ˜ of course has countable cofinality already
in V.
Now if V[h][G][I] is a further subcomplete forcing extension of V[h][G], then as
before, the cofinality of κn, for n < ω, cannot change. Moreover, the sequence
〈κn | n < ω〉 is definable in V[h][G][I] from the parameter α, as the enumeration
of the next ω many ordinals beyond α that are GCH survivors in M. Hence, a
is definable as the set of n < ω such that cf(κn) = ω1. So the statement ϕ(a),
expressing that there is an α such that ψ(a, α) holds, meaning that if 〈λi | i < ω1〉
enumerates the next ω many GCH survivors beyond α in M, then for all n < ω,
n ∈ a iff cf(λn) = ω1, is subcomplete-forceably necessary, and hence true in V, by
MPSC. Note that the lightface MPSC implies the form that allows parameters from
Hω1 , see [6, Theorem 2.6], [23, Lemma 1.10, Theorem 1.11, Corollary 1.12]; the
point is that subcomplete forcing does not change Hω1 .
Now, the proof can be completed as before. Given a ⊆ ω, let β be such that
ψ(a, β) holds. In VCol(ω1,β), and in any further subcomplete forcing extension,
ψ(a, β) continues to hold, and β < ω2 there. Thus, if we let αa be least such that
ψ(a, αa) holds, it is subcomplete forceably necessary that αa < ω2, and so, it is
already less than ω2. This shows that if we define a < b iff αa < αb, for a, b ⊆ ω,
then this is a well-ordering of P(ω), as wished. 
As before, the conclusion of the previous theorem implies that P(ω) ⊆ HOD.
It is easy to see that MPSC(Hω2) is preserved by subcomplete forcing notions
that don’t change Hω2 , that is, that don’t add subsets of ω1 (see [6, Lemma 4.2] for
the corresponding fact in the context of <κ-closed forcing, the proof of which easily
generalizes). In particular, it is preserved by <ω2-distributive forcing notions, since
by [10, Theorem 6.2 and Observation 2.4], every <ω2-distributive forcing notion is
subcomplete. The proof of Theorem 2.7 shows that the requirement of not adding
subsets of ω1 is needed in order to be able to conclude that a subcomplete forcing
preserve MPSC(Hω2), if one insists that it preserve ω2.
Corollary 2.10. Assume there are only set-many grounds. Suppose N is a set-
forcing extension of V such that MPSC(Hω2) holds in N , and that ω
V
2 = ω
N
2 . Then
P(ω1)
V = P(ω1)
N .
Proof. Note that ωV1 = ω
N
1 , so I won’t distinguish between the two. Given a set
A ⊆ ω1 in N , working in N , it follows from the proof of Theorem 2.7 that there
is some α < ω2 such that if one lets 〈κi | i < ω1〉 enumerate the next ω1 many
inaccessible cardinals of MN beyond α, then for all i < ω1, i ∈ A iff cf(κi) = ω1,
and i /∈ A iff cf(κi) = ω. This is because N also only has set-many grounds. This is
because we know that the mantle M of V is the same as the mantle of N , and that
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M is a ground of V, which is a ground of N . So the mantle of N is a ground of N ,
and it was pointed out in the discussion after Definition 2.1 that this is equivalent
to saying that N has only set many grounds.
Moreover, each κi is less than ω2. But since ω
V
2 = ω
N
2 , it follows that cf(κi)
V =
cf(κi)
N : cfV(κi) can only be ω or ω1, since κi < ω2. If cf(κi)
N = ω1, then this is
true in V as well, because V ⊆ N . And if cf(κi)
N = ω, then this holds in V, or else
ωV1 would have to be countable in N .
Now, since MV = MN , it follows that ~κ is definable in V from α, and A is
definable from ~κ, so A ∈ V. 
Focusing on subcomplete forcing notions, we get the following characterization.
Corollary 2.11. Assume MPSC(Hω2) and there are only set-many grounds, and
let P be a subcomplete forcing that preserves ω2. Then P preserves MPSC(Hω2) iff
P doesn’t add subsets of ω1.
These past two corollaries are in stark contrast to the situation with the boldface
maximality principle for countably closed forcing, MPσ-closed(Hω2) (see [6, Lemma
4.10]):
Fact 2.12. MPσ-closed(Hω2) is preserved by the forcing Add(ω1, κ), for any κ.
The requirement of preserving ω2 is necessary in the previous two corollaries,
because if there is a fully reflecting cardinal κ in the original model of MPSC(Hω2),
then one can force to another model of MPSC(Hω2) by doing the standard subcom-
plete forcing iteration, which will render κ the new ω2, and thus will add subsets
to ω1.
To put the assumption that there are only set-many grounds in context, I would
like to point out the following fact, due to Usuba, see [31, Theorem 1.6].
Fact 2.13 (Usuba). If there is a hyper-huge cardinal κ, then there are less than κ
many grounds.
Here κ is hyper-huge if for every λ, there is a j : V −→ M such that j(κ) > λ
and j(λ)M ⊆ M . So the assumption of the previous theorems follows from the
existence of large cardinals. It will turn out that one can get a similar conclusion
from anti-large-cardinal hypotheses. The following is a technical lemma that tries
to get by with as weak an assumption as possible. The status of this assumption is
unclear. It certainly holds if there are only set-many grounds. Let’s introduce the
following notation.
Definition 2.14. For a set X of ordinals and i < otp(X), let (X)i be the i-th
element of X in its monotone enumeration.
Lemma 2.15. Assume MPSC(Hω2), and assume that ψ(x, y, z) is a formula in
the language of set theory such that for some set P ⊆ ω1, we have that for some
α ∈ On,
Iα,P = {β ∈ On | χ(β, α, P )}
has size at least ω1 and consists of GCH survivors. Suppose, moreover, that for
every subcomplete forcing P, if G is generic for P over V, then in V[G], there is an
ordinal α′ such that
Iα,P = (Iα′,P )
V [G]
Then there is a well-order of P(ω1), definable from P .
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Proof. Given a set A ⊆ ω1, and fixing P and α as above, let ψ(α,A, P ) be the
statement saying “for all i < ω1, i ∈ A iff cf((Iα,P )i) = ω1 and i /∈ A iff cf((Iα,P )i) =
ω”. The statement ϕ(A,P ), saying “there is an α′ such that ψ(α′, A, P ) holds” is
then subcomplete-forceably necessary, and hence true. So we can let αA be the
least α′ such that ψ(α′, A, P ) holds and say that A < B iff αA < αB. 
Note that if in the previous lemma, χ(x, y, z) is absolute with respect to subcom-
plete forcing, then it must be the case that for every γ, there is an α > γ such that
Iα,P has order type at least ω1, consists of GCH survivors, and has min(Iα,P ) > γ.
Because otherwise, if γ is a counterexample, then in VCol(ω1,γ), it’s subcomplete-
necessary that there is no α such that Iα,P is as described, and so there is no such
α in V.
Corollary 2.16. Assume MPSC(Hω2), and assume there is no inner model with
an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals. Then there is a well-order of P(ω1)
of order type ω2, definable from a subset of ω1.
Proof. Under the assumption, the core model K exists. Letting δ = ω2, since K is
forcing invariant, it follows that K|δ ≺ K, as before. This implies that the class
of measurable cardinals in K is bounded, as otherwise, δ would be an inaccessible
limit of measurable cardinals in K. Thus, the set of measurable cardinals of K is
bounded in δ. By Mitchell’s covering lemma of [25], there is a “maximal” sequence
of indiscernibles C, which can be viewed as a bounded subset of δ, and hence can
be coded in a simple way by a set D ⊆ ω1, such that for every uncountable set X ,
there is a set Y ∈ K[D] of the same cardinality as X , with X ⊆ Y .
Let 〈κi | i < ω1〉 enumerate the first ω1 many GCH-survivors greater than ω1 in
V, and let I = {κi | i < ω1}. Let Z ∈ K[D] be the <K[D]-least set of ordinals
such that I ⊆ Z and Z has cardinality ω1. Let I¯ be the image of I under the
Mostowski-collapse of Z. I¯ is a bounded subset of ω2.
Clearly then, I ∈ K[D][I¯]. Let D∗ code D and I¯ as a subset of ω1, so that
I ∈ K[D∗]. Let I be the α-th element of K[D∗] in the canonical well-order of
K[D∗], and let ψ(x, y, z) be the formula expressing that y is an ordinal, and that
x belongs to the y-th set of K[z]. If Iα,P is defined from ψ as in the statement of
Lemma 2.15, then we get that Iα,D∗ has size ω1 and consists of GCH-survivors. By
the forcing absoluteness of K[D∗] and Lemma 2.15 then, there is a well-order of
P(ω1) of order type ω2, definable from a subset of ω1. 
3. Well-orders from the bounded subcomplete forcing axiom
Definition 3.1 ([15]). Let P be a notion of forcing, and let B be its Boolean
completion. Then the bounded forcing axiom for P says that given any collection
of ω1 many maximal antichains in B, each having size at most ω1, there is a filter in
B that meets each antichain in the collection. If Γ is a class of forcing notions, then
the bounded forcing axiom for Γ, denoted BFAΓ, says that the bounded forcing
axiom holds for every P ∈ Γ.
Bagaria [1] showed that the bounded forcing axiom can be expressed as a prin-
ciple of generic absoluteness, as follows.
Lemma 3.2. The bounded forcing axiom for a poset P is equivalent to the statement
that for every a ∈ Hω2 and every Σ1-formula ϕ(x) in the language of set theory, if
P (Hω2 |= ϕ(aˇ)), then in V, Hω2 |= ϕ(a).
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The following terminology is from [13].
Definition 3.3. If P is a notion of forcing and p ∈ P is a condition, then P≤p is
the restriction of P to conditions q ≤ p. Two forcing notions P and Q are equivalent
if they give rise to the same forcing extensions. A forcing class Γ is natural if for
every P ∈ Γ and every p ∈ P, there is a Q ∈ Γ such that P≤p is forcing equivalent
to Q.
Fact 3.4. If Γ is natural, then BFAΓ is equivalent to the following statement:
(∗) for every P ∈ Γ and every filter G that is P-generic over V, it follows that
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 ≺Σ1 〈H
V[G]
ω2
,∈〉.
Proof. Clearly, (∗) implies the condition stated in Lemma 3.2, which is equivalent
to the condition stated in Definition 3.1. For the converse, let P, G be as in (∗).
Let ϕ(x) be a Σ1-formula in the language of set theory, a ∈ Hω2 , and assume that
〈H
V[G]
ω2 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a). Let p ∈ G force this. It suffices to show that 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a).
Let Q ∈ Γ be equivalent to P≤p. Then, Q forces that ϕ(aˇ) holds in Hω2 (of the
forcing extension). Thus, since the bounded forcing axiom for Q holds, it follows
from Lemma 3.2 that 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a). 
Most commonly encountered forcing classes are natural. In particular, it follows
from [14, Corollary 3.11] and [10, Observation 2.4] that the class of subcomplete
forcing notions is natural.
Here is a version of Corollary 2.16 with a more restrictive anti-large cardinal
assumption, but with BSCFA in place of MPSC(Hω2).
Lemma 3.5. Suppose 0# does not exist, and that BSCFA holds. Then there is
a well-order of P(ω1) of order type ω2, ∆1-definable without parameters. This
well-order is in L(P(ω1)), is ∆1-definable from a subset I¯ of ω1 there, and it is
∆
〈Hω2 ,∈〉
1 -definable in I¯.
Proof. Following the argument in the proof of Corollary 2.16, let 〈κi | i < ω1〉 enu-
merate the first ω1 many GCH survivors greater than ω1. Let Z ∈ L be the L-least
set of ordinals such that I := {κi | i < ω1} ⊆ Z and Z has cardinality ω1. Let
πZ : Z −→ otp(Z) be the Mostowski-collapse of Z, and let I¯ = πZ“I.
For a set of ordinals x, let (x)i be the i-th element of x in its monotone enu-
meration. Let A ⊆ ω1 be given. Then, for some forcing extension V′ of V by some
subcomplete forcing, the statement ϕ(A, I¯) =“there is a set of ordinals x ∈ L[I¯]
such that for all i < ω1, i ∈ A iff cf((x)i) = ω1, and i /∈ A iff cf((x)i) = ω” holds in
HV
′
ω2
. To see this, note that I ∈ L[I¯], since I is coded by Z and I¯, and we can force
GCH up to sup(I), passing to V[G], and then use Jensen’s extended Namba forcing
to code A into the cofinality ω/ω1-pattern on I, thus producing a forcing extension
V[G][H ] in which ϕ(A, I¯) holds (as witnessed by x = I). In a last step, if necessary,
we can force over V[G][H ] with Col(ω1, sup(x)), where x is the L[I¯]-least witness
to ϕ(A, I¯), reaching V′, so that the truth of ϕ(A, I¯) is already visible in HV
′
ω2
. It’s
easy to see that ϕ can be written as a Σ1 formula. So, by BSCFA, it follows that
Hω2 |= ϕ(A, I¯). This can be done for every A ⊆ ω1. We can thus let f(A) be the
L[I¯]-least x witnessing that ϕ(A, I¯) holds. Then A < B iff f(A) < f(B) is a well-
order of P(ω1), and since for every A, f(A) < ω2, the order type of that well-order
is ω2. Since I¯ is definable without parameters, this well-order is definable without
parameters.
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Note that for any γ < ω2,
ω1γ ⊆ L(P(ω1)) and that for any A, the L[I¯]-least x
witnessing that ϕ(A, I¯) holds already exists in L[I¯]Hω2 . It follows that L(P(ω1))
is correct about the cofinality of (x)i, for i < ω1, and hence that in L(P(ω1)), the
well-ordering of P(ω1) described above is definable from I¯. 
Paralleling the treatment of MPSC(Hω2) in the previous section, let’s draw a
conclusion which is related to the question which forcing notions preserve BSCFA.
It’s easy to see that subcomplete forcing notions that don’t add subsets of ω1 (and
thus don’t change Hω2) preserve BSCFA. One might hope that the requirement of
not adding subsets of ω1 can be dropped, but the following lemma shows that this
is not the case, at least in the absence of 0#, and if one insists that the forcing
preserve ω2.
Lemma 3.6. Assume 0# does not exist. Suppose N is a set-forcing extension of
V with ω2 = ω
N
2 , and that N satisfies BSCFA. Then P(ω1)
V = P(ω1)N .
Proof. Observe that ωV1 = ω
N
1 . Let N = V[g], where g is generic for P over V.
Let 〈κi | i < ω1〉 enumerate the next ω1 many GCH survivors greater than the
cardinality of P. Then every κi is a GCH survivor in N as well. Let I := {κi | i <
ω1} ⊆ Z ∈ L, Z ⊆ On, and let I¯ = πZ“I, where, as before, πZ is the Mostowski-
collapse of Z.
Let A ⊆ ω1, A ∈ N . I have to show that A ∈ V. Working in N , the argument of
the proof of Lemma 3.5 shows that there is a set of ordinals x ∈ L[I¯], x ⊆ ω2, such
that for all i < ω1, i ∈ A iff cf((x)i) = ω1, and i /∈ A iff cf((x)i = ω). But note
that if γ < ω2, then cf(γ)
V = cf(γ)N , ωV1 = ω
N
1 . Hence, A can be defined from x
in V. 
It is possible to produce a forcing extension of a model of BSCFA+¬0#, preserv-
ing ω1, and adding subsets of ω1, to reach another model of BSCFA, but collapsing
ω2. To see this, recall the concept of a reflecting cardinal: a regular cardinal κ is
reflecting if for every formula ϕ(x) and every a ∈ Hκ, if there is a cardinal γ > κ
such that 〈Hγ ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a), then there is a cardinal γ¯ < κ such that a ∈ Hγ¯ and
〈Hγ¯ ,∈〉 |= ϕ(a). Reflecting cardinals were introduced in [15], where it was shown
that the consistency strength of BPFA is precisely a reflecting cardinal. This was
extended in [7] to BSCFA. In detail, it was shown there that BSCFA implies that
ω2 is reflecting in L, and that if κ is reflecting, then there is a subcomplete forcing
P that’s κ-c.c., has size κ, collapses κ to become ω2, and such that BSCFA holds in
VP. Thus, if we start in a model of set theory with two reflecting cardinals, κ < δ,
in which we may assume 0# does not exist, then we may use κ to reach a forcing
extensionM in which BSCFA holds, δ still is reflecting, and 0# does not exist. Now
we can use the reflecting cardinal δ in M to force BSCFA again, collapsing ω2. So
the requirement that ω2 be preserved in the previous lemma is necessary.
It is obvious that in the previous two lemmas, the assumption that 0# does not
exist can be replaced with the weaker assumption that there is some x ⊆ ω such
that x# does not exist.
4. More reflection, or: what is the bounded forcing axiom for
countably closed forcing?
The most obvious way to try to obtain the consequences of Theorem 2.7, with
the assumption of MPSC(Hω2) weakened to a form of the bounded forcing axiom,
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would seem to be to replace Σ1-elementarity in Fact 3.4 with Σ2-elementarity.
This motivates the following definition. I will analyze the resulting principles, and
propose an answer to the question stated in the section title.
Definition 4.1. Let Γ be a natural forcing class and n ∈ ω. Then the principle
Σn-BFAΓ says that whenever G is generic for some P ∈ Γ, it follows that
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 ≺Σn 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G].
However, if the forcing class in question contains the class of ccc forcing notions,
then the resulting principle is inconsistent, for n ≥ 2.
Observation 4.2. Let Γ be a natural forcing class.
(1) If there is a P ∈ Γ that necessarily adds a real, then BFAΓ implies the failure
of CH.
(2) BFAccc implies Souslin’s hypothesis, i.e., that there is no Souslin tree.
(3) Σ2-BFAccc is inconsistent.
Proof. For (1), assume BFAΓ, and suppose P ∈ Γ adds a real. Assume, towards a
contradiction, that CH holds. Then a = P(ω) ∈ Hω2 . If G is P-generic, then the
Σ1-statement ϕ(a), expressing “there is an x ⊆ ω with x /∈ a” holds in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G]
,
but not in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V, a contradiction.
(2) is clear, because if T were a Souslin tree, then, viewing T as a notion of
forcing in the usual way, T is ccc, and if b ⊆ T is T -generic, then the Σ1-statement
“there is a function f : ω −→ T such that for all α < β < ω1, f(α) <T f(β)” in
the parameters T and ω1 holds in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G]
, but of course not in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V
.
(3) now follows because a Souslin tree can be added by ccc forcing (for example,
Cohen forcing adds a Souslin tree). But if V[G] has a Souslin tree, then this can
be expressed as a Σ2 statement in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G]
. But then, Σ2-BFAccc would imply
that there is a Souslin tree in V, contradicting (2). 
The situation with countably closed forcing is different, though. It is well-known,
and easy to see, that the full version of Martin’s axiom for countably closed forcing
is provable in ZFC: if P is countably closed and D is a collection of ω1 many maximal
antichains in P, then there is a filter in P that meets each antichain. Hence, forcing
axioms for countably closed forcing have not been considered, with the exception
of the “+”-versions, introduced in [5].
I will argue that the Σ2-BFAσ-closed is the correct version of the bounded forcing
axiom for countably closed forcing. First, note that the class of countably closed
forcing notions is natural. It thus follows from Fact 3.4 that:
Fact 4.3. Whenever P is a countably closed forcing notion and G is P-generic,
then
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 ≺Σ1 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G]
.
Thus, the axiom Σ2-BFAσ-closed says that we have one more level of absoluteness
than ZFC guarantees. This is what BFAΓ says for the classes of ccc or proper
forcing as well. In this sense, Σ2-BFAσ-closed seems to be a good candidate for
the “correct” version of the bounded forcing axiom for countably closed forcing.
Another requirement is of course that it should be consistent, from adequate large
cardinal assumptions. Recall that it was shown in Goldstern-Shelah [15] that the
consistency strength of the bounded proper forcing axiom is a reflecting cardinal.
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Definition 4.4 ([15, Def. 2.2]). A regular cardinal κ is reflecting if for every a ∈ Hκ,
and every formula ϕ(x), the following holds: if there is a regular cardinal θ ≥ κ
such that Hθ |= ϕ(a), then there is a cardinal θ¯ < κ such that Hθ¯ |= ϕ(a).
I showed in [7] that the consistency strength of BSCFA is also a reflecting cardi-
nal. The following theorem thus supports very strongly the claim that the axiom
Σ2-BFAσ-closed is the correct version of the bounded forcing axiom for countably
closed forcing.
Theorem 4.5. The consistency strength of Σ2-BFAσ-closed is a reflecting cardinal.
More precisely:
(1) If κ is a reflecting cardinal and G is generic for Col(ω1, <κ), then the
principle Σ2-BFAσ-closed holds in V[G].
(2) The axiom Σ2-BFAσ-closed implies that ω
V
2 is a reflecting cardinal in L.
Proof. For (1), let κ and G be as described. In V[G], let Q be a countably closed
forcing notion, and let H be Q-generic over V[G]. Let a ∈ H
V[G]
ω2 , let ϕ(x) be
a Σ2-formula, and suppose that 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G][H] |= ϕ(a). Since κ is inaccessible,
Col(ω1, <κ) is κ-cc, and it follows that there is some α < κ such that if we let
Gα = G ∩Col(ω1, <α), then a ∈ H
V[Gα]
ω2 . Let G[α,κ) = G ∩ Col(ω1, [α, κ)).
It is well-known that H can be absorbed into a collapse, meaning that in
V[G], there is a regular cardinal τ such that Col(ω1, [κ, τ)) is forcing equivalent to
Q × Col(ω1, [κ, τ)). Thus, if we let I be Col(ω1, [κ, τ))-generic over V[G][H ], then
there is an I∗ which is generic over V[G] for Col(ω1, [κ, τ)) such that V[G][H ][I] =
V[G][I∗] = V[Gα][G[α,κ)][I
∗]. Let ϕ(x) = ∃yψ(x, y), where ψ(x, y) is a Π1-formula,
and let b ∈ H
V[G][H]
ω2 be such that H
V[G][H]
ω2 |= ψ(a, b). Then by Fact 4.3, it fol-
lows that H
V[G][H][I]
ω2 |= ψ(a, b) as well, in particular, H
V[G][H][I]
ω2 |= ϕ(a). Since
V[G][H ][I] = V[Gα][G[α,κ)][I
∗], we have that
H
V[Gα][G[α,κ)][I
∗]
ω2 |= ϕ(a).
Now, working in V[Gα], let θ > κ be a regular cardinal such that in H
V[Gα]
θ ,
there is a condition p in G[α,κ) × I
∗ that forces with respect to Col(ω1, [α, κ)) ×
Col(ω1, [κ, τ)) ∼= Col(ω1, [α, τ)) that in the extension, it is true that 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 |= ϕ(aˇ)
holds. Actually, since Col(ω1, [α, τ)) is weakly homogeneous, it follows that the
empty condition already forces this. By reflection, there is now a regular cardinal
θ such that in H
V[Gα]
θ , the it is the case that there is a regular cardinal τ
′ such
that Col(ω1, [α, τ
′)) forces that ϕ(aˇ) holds in the structure 〈Hω2 ,∈〉, as computed
in the extension. Since κ is still reflecting in V[Gα], it follows that there is a regular
cardinal θ′ < κ such that the same statement is true in H
V[Gα]
θ′ . Letting τ
′ witness
this, it then follows that ϕ(a) holds in H
V[G′τ )
ω2 , and as before, this persists to H
V[G]
ω2 ,
by Fact 4.3. Thus, 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G] |= ϕ(a), as wished.
For (2), let κ = ωV2 . Clearly then, κ is a regular cardinal in L. To show that it
is reflecting in L, let θ > κ be a regular cardinal in L, a ∈ HLκ = Lκ, and ϕ(a) a
formula that holds in HLθ = Lθ. Let G be generic for Col(ω1, θ). Then ω
V[G]
2 > θ,
and in 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G]
, the statement ψ(a) expressing the following holds: “there is
a θ¯ such that θ¯ is regular in L and such that ϕ(a) holds in 〈Lθ¯,∈〉.” Saying that
θ¯ is regular in L is equivalent to saying that θ¯ is regular in L
ω
V[G]
2
= LH
V[G]
ω2 , and
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this can be expressed in H
V[G]
ω2 by saying that for every f , if f ∈ L, then if f is
a function from some γ < θ¯ to θ¯, the range of f is bounded in θ¯. Saying that
f ∈ L is a Σ1 statement, so the conditional is Π1, and it is thus easily seen that
ψ(a) can be chosen to be a Σ2-formula. Thus, by Σ2-BFAσ-closed, it follows that
〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V |= ψ(a), and if we let θ¯ witness this, then θ¯ < κ is regular in L and
〈Lθ¯,∈〉 |= ϕ(a), as wished. 
The following observation completes the picture, illustrating that Σ2-BFAσ-closed
plays the role in the context of countably closed forcing that BFAΓ (equivalently,
Σ1-BFAΓ) played in the case where Γ is the class of proper or subcomplete forcing
notions, and parallels Observation 4.2, with the role the Souslin trees used to play
taken over by Kurepa trees.
Observation 4.6. The following facts hold about the principles Σn-BFAσ-closed.
(1) The principle Σ2-BFAσ-closed implies CH, and even ♦.
(2) Furthermore, Σ2-BFAσ-closed implies the failure of Kurepa’s hypothesis, that
is, it implies that there are no Kurepa trees.
(3) The principle Σ3-BFAσ-closed is inconsistent.
Proof. (1) follows because the principle ♦ can be forced by countably closed forcing,
for example by Add(ω1, 1), and it is easy to see that ♦ can be expressed by a Σ2
sentence in Hω2 , using ω1 as a parameter: there is a sequence 〈Dα | α < ω1〉 such
that for every set A ⊆ ω1 and every club set C ⊆ ω1, there is an α ∈ C such that
A ∩ α = Cα.
For (2), suppose T ∈ Hω2 were a Kurepa tree. Let κ be the cardinality of the
set of cofinal branches through T . Then after forcing with Col(ω1, κ), say to reach
V[G], T is no longer a Kurepa tree, because Col(ω1, κ), and more generally, no
countably closed forcing, can add a cofinal branch to T . But the statement that T
is a Kurepa tree can be expressed overHω2 by a Π2 formula ϕ(T ), essentially saying
that T is an ω1 tree such that for every set x, there is a cofinal branch through T
that’s not in x (since every set in Hω2 has size at most ω1). Thus, in this scenario,
it is not true that 〈Hω2 ,∈〉 ≺Σ2 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
V[G]
.
For (3), assuming Σ3-BFAσ-closed, we know by (2) that there is no Kurepa tree.
But it is well-known that a Kurepa tree may be added by a countably closed poset.
Let V[G] be obtained by forcing with such a poset. Then, since we have just
seen in the proof of (2) that “T is Kurepa” is a Π2 statement about T in Hω2 ,
the statement “there is a Kurepa tree” is expressed by a true Σ3 sentence over
H
V[G]
ω2 . So by Σ3-BFAσ-closed, it follows that there is a Kurepa tree in V after all, a
contradiction. 
A similar analysis can be carried out for the class of <κ-closed forcing notions,
for some regular cardinal κ > ω1. The adequate “bounded forcing axiom” for this
class would then say that whenever G is generic for some <κ-closed forcing notion,
then
〈Hκ+ ,∈〉 ≺Σ2 〈Hκ+ ,∈〉
V[G]
.
If we slightly abuse notation and denote the resulting principle Σ2-BFA<κ-closed,
then the version of Observation 4.6 reads:
Observation 4.7. Let κ ≥ ω1 be a regular cardinal.
(1) The principle Σ2-BFA<κ-closed implies 2
<κ = κ, and even ♦κ.
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(2) Furthermore, Σ2-BFA<κ-closed implies that there are no slim κ-Kurepa trees.
(3) The principle Σ3-BFA<κ-closed is inconsistent.
For details concerning slim κ-Kurepa trees in this context, see [6, Lemma 3.2,
Theorem 3.3]. The consistency strength analysis carries over as well, as follows.
The version of Fact 4.3 for <κ-closed forcing does not follow from Fact 3.4, but
instead, one can appeal to [22, p. 298, (I6)] and the argument of [13, Observation
4.19], under the assumption that 2<κ = κ. The following theorem can then be
proven, using the argument of the proof of Theorem 4.5, mutatis mutandis.
Theorem 4.8. Let κ be a regular cardinal. Then the consistency strength of
Σ2-BFA<κ-closed is a reflecting cardinal, in the following sense:
(1) If θ > κ is a reflecting cardinal and G is generic for Col(κ,<θ), then the
principle Σ2-BFA<κ-closed holds in V[G].
(2) The axiom Σ2-BFA<κ-closed implies that (κ
+)V is a reflecting cardinal in L.
Some open questions from [6] translate to open questions about these bounded
forcing axioms. For example, is the principle Σ3-BFA<κ-directed-closed consistent, as-
suming the consistency of large cardinals? The argument that works for <κ-closed
forcing does not go through for <κ-directed closed forcing, because it is not gener-
ally true that one can add a slim κ-Kurepa tree by <κ-directed closed forcing.
Returning to subcomplete forcing, it is an interesting question whether Σ2-BSCFA
(that is Σ2-BFAΓ, where Γ is the class of subcomplete forcing notions) is consistent.
Here is a consistency strength lower bound.
Corollary 4.9. If Σ2-BSCFA holds, then every real has a sharp.
Proof. Suppose there was some r ⊆ ω such that r# does not exist. By the remark
at the end of Section 3, it follows by Lemma 3.5 that there is a set I¯ ⊆ ω1 such that
in Hω2 , a well-order of P(ω1) can be defined from I¯ in a ∆1 way. Now let A ⊆ ω1 be
generic for Add(ω1, 1). By BSCFA, we know that CH holds (see Observation 4.6.(1)),
so that Add(ω1, 1) has size ω1 and hence preserves ω2. Now in H
V
ω2
, there is a Σ1-
definable function F from ω2 onto P(ω1), and the statement that for every subset
x of ω1, there is an α such that x = F (α) is a Π2 statement using the parameter
I¯. Thus, by Σ2-SCFA, that same statement holds in H
V[A]
ω2 . So let α < ω
V[A]
2 = ω
V
2
be such that A = FH
V[A]
ω2 (α). It then follows that FH
V[A]
ω2 (α) = FH
V
ω2 (α), so that
A ∈ HVω2 , a contradiction. 
5. Enhanced bounded forcing axioms
It would be desirable to prove versions of Theorem 2.7 and Corollary 2.16 for a
version of BSCFA instead of MPSC(Hω2). MPSC(Hω2) was needed because the com-
plexity of the forcing invariant inner model used exceeded what can be expressed
in a Σ1 way inside Hω2 . The previous section showed that this problem cannot
be resolved simply by working with Σn − BSCFA: for n = 2, it is unclear whether
this principle is consistent, and for n ≥ 3, it is inconsistent. Moreover, the forcing
invariant inner model used in the earlier arguments might not even be locally de-
finable in Hω2 . So the idea is to formulate a slightly strengthened form of BSCFA,
where Hω2 is equipped with the requisite knowledge about V.
Definition 5.1. Let I be a class term, using parameters from Hω2 . Let Γ be a class
of forcing notions. Then BFAΓ(I) says that whenever P is a forcing notion in Γ, a ∈
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Hω2 and ϕ(x) is a Σ1-formula in the language of set theory with an extra predicate
symbol I˙ such that P forces that in the extension, 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉 |= ϕ(a) holds
(equivalently, whenever G is P-generic over V, then 〈H
V[G]
ω2 ,∈, I
V[G] ∩H
V[G]
ω2 〉 |=
ϕ(a)), then 〈HVω2 ,∈, I
V ∩HVω2〉 |= ϕ(a).
Fact 5.2. If Γ is natural, then BFAΓ(I) is equivalent to the following statement:
(∗) for every P ∈ Γ and every filter G that is P-generic over V, it follows that
〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉 ≺Σ1 〈H
V[G]
ω2
,∈, IV[G] ∩HV[G]ω2 〉.
Proof. The proof of Fact 3.4 goes through. 
The idea of enhancing the structure Hω2 with a predicate in order to strengthen
the bounded forcing axiom is not new. Using this terminology, for example, BMM++
can be expressed equivalently as BMM(NSω1), see [33, Lemma 10.94].
Not any class term I can be used to enhance bounded forcing axioms, as we shall
see. Let’s explore some restrictions, and the relationship to maximality principles.
After all, what we are looking for is an enhanced bounded forcing axiom that will
still have the desired effects on the existence of definable well-orders of P(ω1), while
being weaker than the full maximality principle.
Remark 5.3. Let I be a class term, and let Γ be a natural forcing class.
(1) If (∗) holds, then I ∩ Hω2 is immune to Γ, meaning that that for any
subcomplete forcing P, if G is P-generic over V, then I∩Hω2 = I
V[G]∩HVω2 .
(2) If MPΓ(Hω2) holds, the definition of I only uses parameters from Hω2 (if
any) and Γ-necessarily, I ∩Hω2 is immune to Γ (meaning that whenever G
is generic for a poset in Γ, then in V[G], IV[G]∩H
V[G]
ω2 is immune to Γ
V[G]),
then BFAΓ(I) holds.
Proof. For (1), let G be P-generic, where P ∈ Γ. By (∗), 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉 ≺Σ1
〈H
V[G]
ω2 ,∈, I
V[G] ∩H
V[G]
ω2 〉. This clearly implies that I ∩Hω2 = I
V[G] ∩Hω2 .
To see (2), let G be generic for some P ∈ Γ, let a ∈ Hω2 , and suppose that
〈H
V[G]
ω2 ,∈, I
V[G] ∩H
V[G]
ω2 〉 |= ϕ(a), where ϕ(x) is a Σ1-formula in the language of
set theory with an extra predicate symbol. We have to show that already in V,
〈Hω2 ,∈, I〉 |= ϕ(a) holds.
By assumption, IV[G] is immune to ΓV[G] in V[G]. This implies that whenever
H is generic over V[G] for some forcing Q ∈ ΓV[G], then
〈HV[G][H]ω2 ,∈, I
V[G][H] ∩HV[G][H]ω2 〉 |= ϕ(a),
because ϕ(x) is Σ1 and H
V[G]
ω2 is a transitive subset of H
V[G][H]
ω2 . Hence, the state-
ment “〈Hω2 ,∈, I〉 |= ϕ(a)” is Γ-necessary in V[G]. Since the definition of I only
requires parameters from Hω2 , MPΓ(Hω2) applies, and it follows that already in V
it is the case that 〈Hω2 ,∈, I〉 |= ϕ(a), as claimed. 
Note that NSω1 is immune with respect to stationary set preserving forcing
notions, and so, if Γ is a class of Γ-necessarily stationary set preserving forcing
notions, then MPΓ(Hω2) implies BFAΓ(NSω1), or what one might call BFA
++
Γ .
If the class I is definable in Hω2 , then clearly, BFAΓ(I) can be viewed as carefully
strengthening the elementarity stated in Lemma 3.4.
Returning to the enhanced bounded forcing axioms of the form BFAΓ(I), the
following example arises from considering the proof of Observation 4.6.
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Example 5.4. Let T be the set of all ω1-Kurepa trees whose nodes are countable
ordinals. Then BFAσ-closed(T ) is inconsistent.
Note that the class of countably closed forcing notions is contained in any of
the forcing classes of interest here, such as the subcomplete, proper, or stationary
set preserving forcing notions. Thus, the enhanced bounded forcing axiom for this
class, BFAσ-closed(I), is the weakest one. The example hence shows that one has to
be careful in choosing the class term I by which one wants to enhance the bounded
forcing axiom.
The argument in the proof of Observation 4.6 also shows that MPσ-closed(Hω2)
implies that T = ∅, and that T is immune to σ-closed forcing, but T is never
σ-closed-necessarily immune to σ-closed forcing. Hence, this extra assumption in
Remark 5.3.(2) can’t be dropped, and it does not follow automatically.
Here is a version of Lemma 2.15 for the context of enhanced bounded subcom-
plete forcing axioms.
Lemma 5.5. Assume that ψ(x, y, z) is a formula in the language of set theory such
that for some set P ⊆ ω1 and some α ∈ On,
Iα,P = {β ∈ On | ψ(β, α, P )}
has size at least ω1 and consists of GCH survivors, and that Iα,P is absolute to
subcomplete forcing extensions. Let
IP = {〈γ, δ〉 | ψ(γ, δ, P )}
Then BSCFA(IP ) implies the existence of a well-order of P(ω1), definable from P .
This well-order is ∆
〈Hω2 ,∈,IP 〉
1
Proof. Given a set A ⊆ ω1, and fixing P and α as above, let ϕ(α,A, P ) be the
statement saying “for all i < ω1, i ∈ A iff cf((Iα,P )i) = ω1 and i /∈ A iff cf((Iα,P )i) =
ω”. The statement ϕ(A,P ), saying “there is an α′ such that ϕ(α′, A, P ) holds” is
then true in 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉
V[G], where G is generic for the subcomplete forcing
to code A into the cofinality ω/ω1-pattern and to collapse α to ω1. Since ϕ is Σ1
(using I as a predicate), it follows from BSCFA(IP ) that ϕ(A,P ) is true in V. So
we can let f(A) be the least α′ such that ϕ(α′, A, P ) holds and say that A < B iff
f(A) < f(B). 
Let C = {α | α is a GCH survivor}. The strengthening of BSCFA I’ll be mostly
interested in is BSCFA(CM). That is, the class used to enhance BSCFA is the
relativization of the class of all GCH survivors to the mantle M. Obviously, since
M is forcing-absolute, so is CM. In particular, subcomplete-necessarily, CM ∩Hω2
is immune to subcomplete forcing, and since the definition of CM ∩ Hω2 needs no
parameters, it follows from Remark 5.3.(2) that MPSC(Hω2) implies BSCFA(C
M).
The point of BSCFA(CM) is that it has the same consequences as MPSC(Hω2), in
terms of the existence of definable well-orders of P(ω1).
Lemma 5.6. If there are only set many grounds and BSCFA(CM) holds, then there
is a well-order of P(ω1) that’s ∆
〈Hω2 ,∈,C
M∩Hω2〉
1 -definable, and 2
ω1 = ω2. This holds
also with the weakened assumption that there is an α such that C \ α = CM \ α.
Proof. Let ψ(x, y, z) express that x and y are ordinals, and that x > y is a GCH
survivor in M (the variable z is not used). If there are only set-many grounds, then
if α is at least as large as the size of the forcing leading from M to V, then, in
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the notation of Lemma 5.5, Iα,∅ satisfies the assumptions made in that lemma. It
follows that BSCFA(I∅) has the consequences claimed. But clearly, I∅ is definable
from CM in a very simple way, so that the conclusion follows from BSCFA(CM). 
The following corollary is derivable as before.
Corollary 5.7. Assume that there are only set-many grounds, N is a set-forcing
extension of V, ωV2 = ω
N
2 and N |= BSCFA(C
M). Then P(ω1)V = P(ω1)N .
Not surprisingly, there is a version of Corollary 2.16 for an appropriately en-
hanced bounded subcomplete forcing axiom.
Corollary 5.8. Suppose there is no inner model with an inaccessible limit of mea-
surable cardinals, and assume BSCFA(K,CardK) holds. Then there is a definable
well-order of P(ω1).
Proof. It follows from the assumptions that the set of measurable cardinals of K is
bounded in δ = ωV2 . For otherwise, for every γ < δ, the statement “there is a mea-
surable cardinal greater than γ in K˙” is true in 〈Hω2 ,∈,K ∩Hω2 ,Card
K〉
VCol(ω1,κ)
,
where κ > γ is measurable in K. This can be expressed in a Σ1 way in this
structure, and hence it is already true in 〈Hω2 ,∈,K ∩Hω2 ,Card
K〉. Thus, δ is an
inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals in K. This contradicts our assumption.
Thus, using Mitchell’s covering lemma, there a subset D of ω1 that codes a maximal
set of indiscernibles for K such that K[D] satisfies Jensen covering. Now, letting X
be the next ω1 many GCH survivors greater than ω1, it follows as before there is a
set X¯ ⊆ ω1, such that X ∈ K[D][X¯]. Letting P = C⊕ X¯ , we can now let ψ(x, y, z)
be the statement that x and y are ordinals, and that x belongs to the y-th element
of K˙[z]. Then there is an α such that Iα,P has size at least ω1, and the corollary
follows from Lemma 5.5. 
It turns out that BSCFA(CM) is no stronger than BSCFA (in consistency-strength).
In the proof of this fact, I’ll use some standard notation: I write C′ for the set of
all limit points below the supremum of a set C of ordinals, and Sλκ stands for the
set of ordinals less than λ of cofinality κ.
Lemma 5.9. The consistency strength of BSCFA(CM) is a reflecting cardinal.
Proof. Clearly, a reflecting cardinal is a lower bound, because BSCFA(CM) implies
BSCFA, and the consistency strength of the latter is a reflecting cardinal, see [7,
Theorem 3.6].
To see that a reflecting cardinal is an upper bound, recall that reflecting cardinals
go down to L, so we may assume V = L and that there is a reflecting cardinal.
In [7], it was shown that there is then a κ-c.c. subcomplete forcing which forces
BSCFA + κ = ω2. Let’s call the resulting model L[g]. Note that M
L[g] = L, and
hence, in L[g], CM = CL is just the class of ordinals that are regular cardinals in
L. This remains true in any further forcing extension of L[g]. Hence, it suffices to
show that BSCFA(CL) holds in L[g].
In fact, I will show that in general, BSCFA+¬0# implies BSCFA(CL). To see this,
assume BSCFA+¬0#, and letN = V[g], where g is generic for a subcomplete forcing
P. Let a ∈ Hω2 , and let ϕ(x) be a Σ1-formula such that 〈H
N
ω2
,∈,CL ∩ ωN2 〉 |= ϕ(a).
Note that if ρ is a cardinal in L, then CLρ = CL ∩ ρ. I’ll use a trick I employed
in [7], and which goes back to Todorcˇevic´ [29], to express that an ordinal is regular
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in L in a “Σ1 way”, using the canonical global -sequence ~C of L from Jensen [17].
That is,
~C = 〈Cα | α is a singular ordinal in L〉
and for every L-singular α, Cα ⊆ α is club, otp(Cα) < α, and if β ∈ C′α, then β is
singular in L and Cβ = Cα ∩ β. ~C is Σ1-definable in L.
Note that every ordinal α ∈ (Sω3ω )
N greater than ωN2 is singular in L, since a
subset of α of order type ω can be covered by a subset of α in L that has order
type less than ωN2 , using our assumption that 0
# does not exist, by Jensen’ covering
lemma. So, by Fodor’s theorem, there are a stationary A0 ⊆ (S
ω3
ω )
N , and an ordinal
α0 such that
∀α ∈ A0 otp(Cα) = α0.
Let C be generic for the forcing PA0 to shoot a club of order type ω1 through
A0, which is subcomplete, by [21, Lemma 6.3]. Let D be generic over N [C] for
Col(ω1, ω
N
3 ). Then, in H
N [C][D]
ω2 , the following statement holds: “there are a club
E of order type ω1, with supremum δ, and a β0, and a Y , and a c, such that for
all α ∈ E, otp(Cα) = β0, such that c = CLδ ∩ Y , Y is a transitive set, a ∈ Y , and
ϕ〈Y,∈,c〉(a)” holds. This is witnessed by E = C, δ = ωN3 , β0 = α0, Y = H
N
ω2
. This
is a Σ1-statement in the parameter ω
V
1 . The point is that the map that sends γ to
Lγ is Σ1, and hence, the statement “c = C
Lδ” is expressible in a Σ1 way as well.
Since N [C][D] is a generic extension of V by a subcomplete forcing notion, the
same statement is true in HVω2 , by BSCFA. Let E, δ, β0, Y, c be as in the statement.
It follows that δ is a regular cardinal in L, because if it weren’t, then Cδ would be
defined. δ has cofinality ω1, so it would follow that C
′
δ ∩E is club in δ, and for each
α ∈ C′δ ∩E, we would have that otp(Cδ ∩ α) = otp(Cα) = β0. But there can be at
most one such α. This is a contradiction. Hence, c = CLδ = CL ∩ δ, and it follows
that 〈Y,∈,CL ∩ Y 〉 |= ϕ(a), and hence that 〈Hω2 ,∈,C
L ∩ ω2〉 |= ϕ(a), because
Y is transitive and ϕ is Σ1. Thus, 〈Hω2 ,∈,C
L ∩ ω2〉 ≺Σ1 〈H
N
ω2
,∈,CL ∩ ωN2 〉, as
desired. 
Let’s now try to find an appropriate strengthening of the concept of a reflecting
cardinal that allows us to force BSCFA(I), for adequate classes I – recall that for
some classes, the resulting principle is inconsistent. The terminology adopted in the
following definition is inspired by Bagaria [2]. In that paper, for a natural number
n, C(n) is defined to be the club class of ordinals α such that Vα ≺Σn V. It is
pointed out there that if α ∈ C(1), then α is an uncountable strong limit cardinal,
and Vα = Hα.
Definition 5.10. An inaccessible cardinal κ is C(n)-reflecting iff for every formula
ψ(x), every a ∈ Hκ, and every C(n)-cardinal θ > κ, if 〈Hθ,∈〉 |= ψ(a), then there
is a C(n)-cardinal θ¯ < κ such that a ∈ Hθ¯ and 〈Hθ¯,∈〉 |= ψ(a).
Note that an inaccessible cardinal above which there are no C(n) cardinals is vac-
uously C(n)-reflecting. It would maybe have been more natural to require the exis-
tence of a proper class of C(n) cardinals as part of the definition of C(n)-reflecting
cardinals. In the application, this additional assumption will be made.
Observation 5.11. Let θ be a C(n)-cardinal, let P ∈ Hθ be a forcing notion, and
let G be P-generic over V. Then θ is a C(n)-cardinal in V[G].
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Proof. It is well-known that inaccessible cardinals are preserved by small forcing.
Thus, for n = 0, nothing has to be shown, so let n ≥ 1. Let ϕ(x) be a Σn-formula
and let a ∈ H
V[G]
θ . Noting that H
V[G]
θ = Hθ[G], it has to be shown that
〈Hθ[G],∈〉 |= ϕ(a) ⇐⇒ 〈V[G],∈〉 |= ϕ(a)
Let a = a˙G, where a˙ ∈ Hθ.
Let’s assume that 〈V[G],∈〉 |= ϕ(a). Let p ∈ G be such that p P ϕ(a˙). Let
ϕ′(p,P, a˙) be a formula that expresses that p P ϕ(a˙). Since ϕ is Σn, it follows that
ϕ′ is also Σn. Indeed, consulting any standard text on forcing, one can see that there
is a ∆1 function F such that for every atomic formula χ in the forcing language for
P and every p ∈ P, F (p, χ) = 1 if p P χ and F (p, χ) = 0 otherwise. This can be
used to see that the formula ϕ′ described before is Σn. Since 〈V,∈〉 |= ϕ′(p,P, a˙)
and p,P, a˙ ∈ Hθ, it follows that 〈Hθ,∈〉 |= ϕ
′(p,P, a˙), which means that 〈Hθ,∈〉 |=
(p P ϕ(a˙)), so that 〈Hθ[G],∈〉 |= ϕ(a). The converse is proven analogously. 
Observation 5.12. Suppose P ∈ Hκ is a notion of forcing, where κ is C(n)-
reflecting. Let G ⊆ P be generic. Then in V[G], κ is still C(n)-reflecting.
Proof. Working in V[G], let ψ(x), a ∈ H
V[G]
κ and θ be as in the Definition 5.10.
Let a˙ ∈ HVκ be such that a = a˙
G. Let ψ∗(q,P, a˙) be the statement expressing, for
q ∈ P, that q forces with respect to P that ψ(a˙) holds. Clearly, there is a p ∈ G
such that 〈Hθ,∈〉
V |= ψ∗(p,P, a˙). Since κ is C(n)-reflecting in V, there is then
(in V) a C(n)-cardinal θ¯ < κ such that 〈Hθ¯,∈〉
V |= ψ(p,P, a˙), and in particular,
p,P, a˙ ∈ HV
θ¯
. It follows by Observation 5.11 that θ¯ is a C(n)-cardinal in V[G], and
since H
V[G]
θ¯
= Hθ¯[G], it follows further that 〈Hθ¯,∈〉
V[G] |= ψ(a).

Lemma 5.13. Let I be a class term that’s ∆n+1 (with respect to a fragment of
ZFC that holds in every model of the form Hθ, where θ is an uncountable cardinal),
possibly involving parameters from Hκ, such that subcomplete-necessarily, I ∩Hω2
is immune to subcomplete forcing, meaning that for any subcomplete forcing P, if
G is P-generic over V, then I ∩Hω2 = I
V[G] ∩HVω2 , and this remains true in every
set-forcing extension by a subcomplete forcing. Suppose that κ is a C(n)-reflecting
cardinal, and suppose that there is a proper class of C(n)-cardinals. Then there is
a subcomplete forcing P which forces BSCFA(I).
Proof. Let I be ∆n+1 in the parameters ~b ∈ Hκ. I will construct an RCS iteration
of subcomplete forcing notions of length κ. Following the usual setup, this amounts
to constructing sequences 〈Pα | α ≤ κ〉 and 〈Q˙α | α < κ〉 such that Pα+1 = Pα ∗Q˙α,
and Pλ is the RCS limit of the construction up to λ, for limit λ. So, assuming
Pα is defined, where α is an ordinal less than κ, it suffices to define Q˙α, and thus
Pα+1. To this end, suppose Gα is Pα-generic over V. Inductively, we will have that
Pα ∈ Vκ, and that for all β < α, Pβ is subcomplete and Pβ“Q˙β is subcomplete,”
and Pβ has size ω1 in V
Pβ+1 .
In V[Gα], let, for every Σ1-formula ϕ = ϕ(x) in the language of set theory
with an additional unary predicate symbol I˙, and for every a ∈ H
V[Gα]
ω2 , θϕ,a be
the least θ such that there is a subcomplete forcing P whose subcompleteness is
verified by θ, and which is such that the statement ψϕ(P, a,~b) holds, expressing
SUBCOMPLETE FORCING PRINCIPLES AND DEFINABLE WELL-ORDERS 21
that 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉
V[Gα]
P
|= ϕ(a), if there is such a P. If there is no such P at
all, then let θϕ,a = 0.
Let Qα ∈ V[Gα] be the lottery sum of all subcomplete forcing notions whose
subcompleteness is verified by supϕ,a θϕ,a, followed by Col(ω1,Pα), and let Q˙α be a
Pα-name of minimal rank such that 1lPα forces that Q˙α satisfies the definition given.
Adopting terminology popularized by Hamkins, by the lottery sum of a collection
of forcing notions, I mean the disjoint union of the posets in the collection, with
a common weakest condition above all the conditions in the disjoint union. Thus,
effectively, forcing with this sum amounts to choosing one of the posets in the
collection and forcing with it. It was shown in [24] that the lottery sum of a
collection of subcomplete forcing notions is subcomplete.
(1) θϕ,a < κ.
Proof of (1). Work in V[Gα], where κ is C
(n)-reflecting, by Observation 5.12. Fix
a Σ1-formula ϕ(x) and a set a ∈ H
V[Gα]
ω2 such that in V[Gα], ψϕ(P, a,~b) holds, for
some subcomplete forcing P in V[Gα] (if there is no such P, then θϕ,a = 0, and there
is nothing to show). Note that ω
V[Gα]
2 < κ, so that a ∈ V
V[Gα]
κ . By assumption,
~b ∈ Vκ ⊆ V
V[Gα]
κ as well.
Let θ be a C(n)-cardinal such that in 〈H
V[Gα]
θ ,∈〉, the following statement ψ(a,
~b)
holds: “there are a forcing notion P′, a regular cardinal τ and a set A˙ such
that P(Hτ ) exists, τ verifies the subcompleteness of P′, A˙ = {〈ν, q〉 ∈ Hτ | q ∈
P′ and q P′ “ν ∈ I”}, and P′ 〈Hω2 ,∈, A˙ ∩Hω2〉 |= ϕ(aˇ).” It is easy to see that
such a θ exists, because, working in W = V[Gα], if P
′ is a forcing notion whose
subcompleteness is verified by some regular τ > ω2, and is such that ψϕ(P
′, a,~b)
holds, then if θ′ is any regular cardinal with Hτ ∈ Hθ, it will be true in Hθ that the
subcompleteness of P′ is verified by τ (see [21, Lemma 2.1]). Moreover, fixing P′, if
θ is in addition chosen to be a C(n)cardinal, then it follows that I ∩Hθ = IHθ , and
similarly, A˙ ∩Hθ = A˙Hθ (still working in W ). This is because A˙ can be defined in
〈Hθ¯,∈〉 both by a Σn+1- and a Πn+1-formula. In more detail, let π(x,~b) be a Πn+1
definition of I, and let σ(x,~b) be a Σn+1 definition of I. The equivalence between
these formulas is assumed to be provable in a fragment of ZFC that holds in ev-
ery set of the form Hξ, for any uncountable cardinal ξ. It follows then that when
Hξ ≺Σn W , we have that I
〈Hξ,∈〉 = IV∩Hξ, because if c ∈ I〈Hξ,∈〉, then this means
that 〈Hξ,∈〉 |= σ(c,~b), which implies that σ(c,~b) holds, because since Hξ ≺Σn V,
Σn+1-formulas go up. Vice versa, if c ∈ IV∩Hξ, then this means that π(c,~b) holds,
and this implies that π(c,~b) holds in 〈Hξ,∈〉 as well, since Πn+1 formulas go down.
The same argument can be carried with A˙ in place of I, since “q P′ ν ∈ I” can
be expressed by “q P′ σ(ν)” (which amounts to a Σn+1-formula) or “q P′ π(ν)”
(which amounts to a Πn+1-formula). Since there are arbitrarily large C
(n)cardinals
in V, the same is true in W , and as a result, θ can be chosen so that ψ(a,~b) holds
in 〈H
V[Gα]
θ ,∈〉.
Let θ¯ < κ be a C(n)-cardinal in V[Gα] with a,~b ∈ Hθ¯ such that 〈Hθ¯,∈〉 |= ψ(a,~b).
Let P¯, τ¯ , ˙¯A witness this.
It follows that τ¯ really verifies the subcompleteness of P¯, and that
P¯ “〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉 |= ϕ(aˇ)”.
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Thus, θϕ,a ≤ τ¯ < κ, as claimed. 
Since κ is regular in V[Gα], it follows that supϕ,a θϕ,a < κ, and hence that
Pα+1 ∈ Vκ. This defines the iteration. Let Pκ be its RCS-limit.
Let G be generic for P = Pκ. Standard arguments show that P is κ-cc, and as
a consequence, it follows that κ = ω
V[G]
2 . Let ϕ = ϕ(a) be a Σ1-formula in the
parameter a ∈ H
V[G]
ω2 , in the language of set theory with an extra unary predicate
symbol I˙, and suppose that there is a subcomplete forcing Q = Q˙G such that if H
is Q-generic over V[G], then 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉
V[G][H] |= ϕ(a). Let a ∈ H
V[Gα]
ω2 , and
let p ∈ G force that Q˙ is as described.
Since κ is still C(n)-reflecting in V[Gα], we are in the same situation in V[Gα] as
we are in V, so let’s assume that a ∈ HVω2 . There is then a subcomplete forcing that
forces that in the structure 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩Hω2〉 (in the sense of the forcing extension),
ϕ(a) holds, namely, by the naturalness of the class of subcomplete forcing notions,
there is a subcomplete forcing notion R that’s equivalent to (Pκ)≤p ∗ Q˙. Pick a
C(n)-cardinal θ > κ such that R ∈ Hθ, and such that Hτ ∈ Hθ, where τ verifies
the subcompleteness of R. Let ψ(a,~b) be the statement of the proof of (1). Then
ψ(a,~b) holds in 〈Hθ,∈〉. Now let θ¯ < κ be a C(n)-cardinal such that a,~b ∈ Hθ¯, and
〈Hθ¯,∈〉 |= ψ(a,~b). Let τ¯ , P¯ witness this. Then P¯ is indeed subcomplete, and this
is verified by τ¯ , and by the Σn-correctness of θ¯, it follows that P¯ actually forces
that ϕ(a) holds in 〈Hω2 ,∈, I˙ ∩Hω2〉. So there is a forcing notion in the lottery
sum at stage 0 of the iteration which will make ϕ(a) true in 〈Hω2 ,∈, I˙ ∩Hω2〉,
and hence it is dense that such a forcing notion was chosen. Once ϕ(a) is true
in some 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩H
V[Gα]
ω2 〉, it persists to 〈Hω2 ,∈, I ∩H
V[G]
ω2 〉, since I ∩ Hω2 is
subcomplete-necessarily immune to subcomplete forcing, and since ϕ is Σ1. Thus,
since ϕ and a were chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that the condition stated in
Definition 5.1 holds in V[G]. 
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